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Official Secrcu and the Right to Know 
Peter E. Kane 
Professor Schauer's study presents a clear explication of 
the general concept of �rights• an� the ·right to know· in 
particular. Th1s cosmentary will focus on two of the points 
presented in Professor Schauer'& study and explore them in an 
effort to find -.ore unequivocal answers. Firat, Professor 
Schauer correctly observes that the right to kn1ow, like the 
right of privacy that appears to be-antithetical to it, is not 
explicitly included a.a� the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 
If such a right exists, it llU&t be inferred. Second, .ast of 
what are comK>nly called ·rights� are negative guarantees. 
They are the right not to be interferred with or to be sub­
jected to governl9ental actions that our society hes agreed are 
unfair or improper. On the other hand the right to know 
appears to be a •thou shalt• rather than a •thou shalt not• 
co�mand requirtn� positive action by the govern11ent. These tvo 
problems vill be explored separately and in the order stated. 
l 
First, a philosophical and le�al basis can be found for the 
idea of a right to know. One of the funda.ental concepts 
underlytn� our vhole syste� of participatory democracy--and the 
theoretical underpinning of the First Amendment--is that the 
participants, the electorate, do participate fully and intel­
ligently in the decision-asking process on all ·public issues. 
To do so necessitates being infof'IDed. The basic principle has 
received repeated expression in writings on the theory of 
representative govern11ent frOCll John Milton through John Stuart 
Kill to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Thoaas I. £11erson7 an� Franklyn 
Haiman.l Often this theoretical concept is presented and 
discussed in tenaa of the metaphor of a ·aarketplace of ideas.· 
This earlc.etplace of ideas is described as a free, co.petiti•e 
one tn pure Adam Smith tents tn which ideas flow freely and tn 
vhich the consumere, all of us, are free to select those ideas 
we feel are beat. Alexander Metklejohn said as well tn 
Political Freedom� •At the bottom of every plan of self-govern­
ment ta a baste a�reeaent, in which all c1t11ens have joined, 
that all matteni of public policy shall be decided by corporate 
action,. • • We, the people, acting together, either direct!� 
or through our representatives, 111111ke and administer the law.• 
One problem vith the 1111rlr.etplace 'll!taphor is the clear 
evidence of history that -people do make wrong choices. Con­
aumers can and do make errors in judgment and select ideas that 
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hiatorlcally prO¥e to be vrong. However, this proble� can be 
resolved by recognizing that thcae vho uae the •detplace 
.etaphor in a political context uaually do not extend it to 
include A.dam S•ith'a concept of the .hidden hand· that 
ultiaately always .. kea the right choice. Only Kilton aee-s 
to auggeat thia idea, and then only in a very limited con­
t est. Rather t� core of the 1Rtaphor ia th•t people are free 
to choo.e fro. all the available optiona. lt ta even 
argued that \lt'ong choicea are the direct reault of re.tricted 
options and .. nipulatiofW that inhibit choice. This view 
ta at the heart of criticia• of the perf or.ance of the .. as 
eedia e .. nating fro. all points of the political apectru•. 
On a .are profound level Herbert Karc,uae hae argued that the 
very atructure of our aoe:iety ia pUTpoeely desiRTied to prevent 
the .. jority fro. -...kt� the right choice.3 
The phi loaophical concept of a .. rketplace of ideas in a 
participatoty de110cracy ia confir.ed both by i�plication and 
explicit atate1Rnt in a variety of Supreme Court opinions 
dealing vith .. ttera of freedom of expreaaion. In Lamont v. 
Poat .. ater General, a rare instance in which the Court declared 
an act of Congreas unconatitutional on Firat Allen�nt grounda, 
Juatice Willia• Brennan atated in his concurring opinion, �It 
is true that the Firat Aaeodment containa no apecific guarantee 
of acceas to publicationa. However, the protection of the Bill 
of Rights goea beyond the apecific guarantees to protect from 
co�reaaional abridg.ent thoae equally fundamental peraonal 
rights necessary to .. ke the expre.s guarantees fully 11eaning­
ful. • • •  The diaaemination of ideaa can accompliah nothinR 
i f  otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and 
consider the�. It would be a barren .. rketplace of ideas that 
had only aellera and no buyerw.·4 Rere Juatice Brennan clearly 
atatea a co:nstitutional right to know and even expreaaea that 
right in tet'llla of the .. rltetplace of ideas 1Rtaphor. 
Another exa•ple can be found in Nev York Ti.ea v. United 
State1. The .. jority'a per curiam opini�;-aim ly affinM!d the 
view of the appelate courta that the atte•pt to reatrict the 
free flow of infonMltion throuRh pri.or reatraint vaa unconsti­
tutional. ln one of the aigned concurring opinions Juatice 
Rugo Black atated, ·rn the Firat Aaiendment the FoundinR Fathers 
gave the free preaa the protection it •uat have to fulfill its 
eaaential role in our democracy. The preaa vaa to aerve the 
governed, not the governors • • • •  Only a free and unrestrained 
preas can ef fectively e�poae deception in gove�nt.-5 Here 
Juatice Black expressed clearly both the rights of free acceaa 
to information for all the electorate and the role of the n�a 
media in conveying that infol'1D8tion to the public. 
A third e"4eple fra11 yet another context, that of ohecen­
ity, can again be found in the vorda of Juatice Brennan, this 
title in Roth v. United Statea: -All ideas having even the 
alightest rede�ng •ocial iaportance--unorthodox ideas, 
controversial ideaa, even ideas hateful to the prevailinR 
climate of opinion--have the full protection of the guaranties 
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(of the First Amendment} • • • •  -6 OnCi! again there ie the 
clear implication that a right to know exiete. It should be 
noted that in this case, like the other&, th11 right to know 11 
viewed a& an extension of the freedom of CQalmunication pro­
tected by the Firac A.end\llllent. 
Finally, the philosophical concept of the right to know hae 
been explicitly recognized ae a statute right by the Freedom of 
lnforaation Act of 1966. At the ei�ing of this law President 
Lyndon Johnson called attention to -one of our most essential 
principles: a democracy works beat when the people have all 
the information tha the security of the Nation permits.- He 
went on to express a deep sense of pride that the United 
States ie an open society in vhich the people 'e right to 'know 
ie cheriel�d and guarded.·7 
In eu�. a right to now can be found in the philosophical 
principles that underlie our participatory deinocracy eyetem of 
government. Thie right has been recognized both by implication 
and explicitly in opinions of Justices of the Su pre1111e Court 
de aling vith First Amendment ieeuee ae vell ae in a specific 
act of government�the 1966 Freedom of Informetion Act. 
II 
Turning now to the second ieeue, ie the right to know 
really qualitatively different from other constitutional 
r1ghte? Most recognized constitutional rights prohibit the 
government frOl!I doing something rather than requiring t�at it 
do something� and the right to know seems to euggeet that 
government ie required to do something. Hovever, the language 
of the 1966 Freedom of Information Act clearly etatee that the 
righl to know ia in fact a prohibition of ei>ecific government 
actiona�che acts of keeping things secret. The principle 
that underlies here ie the one noted earlier that the people 
as a vhole in our eyetem of gover-nment are both the governed 
and the governors. Government acte in the name of the pe ople 
for the people. Thue, the government's bueineee ie the 
public's bueinese, and it should therefore remain public. The 
right to know simply prohibits government euppreeeion of 
information. Ae Justice William o. Douglas obeeTVed in 
hie concurring opinion in � �  Times � !.!. United States, 
•The dominant purpose of the Firat Amendment vae to prohibit 
the videepread practice of gove rnmental euppreeeion of eabar­
raaeing information • • Secrecy in government ie 
fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic 
errors. O�n debate and diacuaeion are vital to our national 
health.-6 
In hie study Professor Schauer characterizes.the right to 
knov as ·al110st trivial· vhen simply viewed ae a negative right 
against gover11111ent secrecy. However, a recognition of the 
magnitude o.f the problem of government secrecy leads to the 
conclusion that this negative right ie far from trivial. 
4
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Official •ecrecy today appear• aa • major threat to the p·roper 
.,,orklng of our eyete• of gove �nt. tn their review of the 
problem of secrecy Herold Nelson end Dwight Teeter trace this 
public-gove nmen; conflict to the Second World War era. 
·Acee•• to meetings wee denied, reports, papers, docul'llenta at 
all le•ela of govero.ent seemed lees available then before 
officialdom''• habits of secrecy developed in the passion for 
•ecurity during World Var 11.�9 They see the 1966 Freedom of 
Inforeation Act ae the direct re.ult of the growth of abu.aee-­
positive act• of concealment by govern.ent. 
The iapulae to conceal is understandable. �nOW'ledge 
--information--ia JfiOVer. Anyone who has worked in even 
the amalleat buaineaa or academic coaamlty i&1111ediately 
recognize• this fact aa do our elected political leaders. 
The result ia that neither Justice Douglas' vision nor the 
s.tated objective• of the 1966 freedom of Information Act have 
been realized. Aa Burt Neuborne, national legal director of 
the A.wrican Civil Libertie• Union stated in a recent 
inter1iev, �Infor.atton in the WK>dern world is paver, and some 
of Reagan's people understand this in a very sophisticated 
way. They view infonu.tion as • weapon and are attempting to 
institute • whole range of governmental controls in order to 
fight Co•munism.�to Today by executive order the baste premise 
of the free flow of tnfonnation has been changed. Today 
t.here la a ayatee of document claasif icatlon that allows 
government officials to conceal whatever they, our servants, 
decide that we, their 11aatera, do not need to know. In 
addition these re�ulations require prior approval by all 
affected government agencies of any article or book written 
by any present or even fon1er govern.ent employee•ll 
The negative, non-trivial, •thou shalt not� right t o  know 
•hould prohibit all such govermnental interference with our 
philosophical, constitutional, and statutory right to know. lf 
our 1y1te� of government ta to 1urvtve1 this conduct MU&t be 
Stopped. 
It needs to be clearly stated a t  this point that this 
arguaMtnt deals only with governmental acts of 1ecrecy. Thia 
right, like other constitutional rights deals solely with acts 
of gove rnme nt rather than those of private parties. It does 
not reach to the act• of 1ecrecy of private indi•iduala, even 
thc,,1e vho are identified in the lav as public figures. It must 
however, be recogni%ed that the distinction bet"1een govern­
.-ntal and private 1• not always clear. When a large corpor­
ation engages in violations of the law, illegal dumping of 
toxic vaatea for exa•ple, are these private act• not reached by 
the right to know or are they semi-official, quasi-governmental 
activitie1? If a public utility, a private corporation oper­
ating with a govet1U1ent licenee, i1 guilty of improper conduct, 
are these public, governmental act• about which the public has 
a right to know? The anawera to these questions require • 
clearer definition of what is govet1U1ental as opposed to non­
governmental than now exiets. 
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III 
Finally, where does thia argu.ent for a philoaophicel, 
c,oastitutional. and statutory right to know leave the infor­
mation .edia. Are infonution gatherers to be afforded ao� 
special place or role in thia ache.e! The answer repeatedly 
given by the Supre.e Court ie no. In Branzburg .!.:.. Rayes the 
court clearly atated that reportet"8 have the same rights and 
obl1gat1oas as any other citizen.12 Two yesra later, writing 
for the majority in Pell v. Procunier. Justice Potter Stewert 
declAred unequivoC4lly�The Constitution doea not • • 
require government to accord the preaa special accesa to 
information not shared by members of the public generally.wl3 
In effect. in this scheme. the infot""Utiou gatherers have a 
non-trivial ri�ht to obtain infonution without the limitations 
of governmental secrecy that ts co�xtensive with the right of 
all other citi�ens. However, with the division of labor that 
exists within 1110dern, cOCRplex society, it has become the 
special task of the information gatherers to perform this 
f tmction for the rest of us and to report their findings 
to us. It ahould be recognized that neither is this gathering 
function coaipletely performed nor are the findings fully and 
accurately reported. Even at this level the narketplace of 
ideas does not function in a manner that even approaches 
the ideal and perfect market in the Adam Smith model. 
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